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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOUGLAS FAIRBANKS CLOSE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
District Court No. 
70191 




BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND 
APPELLANT, DOUGLAS FAIRBANKS CLOSE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action involving Plaintiff-Appellant's 
ownership of certain Utah Power and Light Stock which he 
had received a joint ownership with the Deceased Mrs. Edith 
Branscomb, and which passed to him under his rights of 
survivorship upon the death of the decedent. The Honorable 
Douglas Cornaby ORDERED, or ADJUDGED at the close of the 
trial that the said Stock would be divided which was legally 
impossible. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
~--------~~------~----
The matter came to trial on November 13, 1981 in the 
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of 
Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY. He re-
ceived, it after this honorable Court had reversed the 
decision of Judge Ronald 0. Hyde and found for the Plaintiff-
Appellant as to his holding a tenancy in common with the 
··~--~~-~~:~;;~:::",~~~:;:-:::~:;::;:at on the home and Real Property received 
-1-
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by the death of the mother, Edith Branscomb. The Judge 
~o~plied with the findings of this Court and awarded an 
'~ndivided ~ interest in the said property to the said 
App~llant. The Court then awarded ~ of the shares of 
Utah Power and Light stock to the Defendant-Respondent. 
It is that portion of the judgement that this appeal 
is taken from. The Judgement was signed by the Court 
on the 22nd day of December 1981, and the Appellant filed 
his Notice of Appeal on the 6th day of January 1982. 
It is pursuant to that Notice of Appeal that this is 
before this Honorable Court. 
RRLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks for relief from the Judgement 
of the lower court by a reversal of that portion of the 
Court's judgement which illegally divests the said Appellant 
of the Utah Power and Light stock which is rightfully his 
by reason of the death of Mrs. Branscomb in 1977. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
----~--~--~----
1. In 1962 Plaintiff-Appellant's and Defendant-
Respondent's (brother and sister) mother, EDITH BRANSCOMB> 
(now deceased) conveyed her home and real property at 
2527 Gramercy, Ogden, Utah in joint tenancy to herself and 
her daughter, the Defendant-Respondent. She also conveyed 
740 shares of stock in Utah Power and Light in joint tenancy 
to herself and her son, the Plaintiff-Appellant. R.35 
2. Later, on July 29, 1977, the Decedent while still 
alive signed and delivered a Quit Claim Deed to her son, 
Plaintiff-Appellant her interest in the said real property. 
-~-
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3. There is no issue of fact as to the Decedent's 
competancy to convey the properties as she did on the above 
referred to occasions. (See R.194) 
4. The validity of the July 29th 1977 Deed has heretofore 
been determined by the Supreme court of the State of Utah to 
be a valid Deed and that the conveyance of the Decedent's 
interest in the real property had the efEect of creating a 
tenancy in common between the parties to this appeal. R.128 
5. After being remanded to the District court of Weber 
County, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, after hearing the 
evidence about the competancy of the Deced~nt and without 
any evidence at all of a simil?r intervivos modification of 
the joint tenancy relationship of the Plaintiff-Appellant 
and the deceased mother, the Court by his memorandum decision 
of November 13th, 1981 which was finally reduced to judgement 
on December 22, 1981, divested the Plaintiff-Appellant of 
one half (~) of the Utah Power and Light Stock. R.198. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUES 
1. WHETHER THE COURT MAY LEGALLY ALTER OR MODIFY 
THE RIGHTS OF OWNERS OF STOCK IN JOINT TENANCY 
CREATED IN 1962 BY A PERSON OF SOUND MIND, WHICH 
HAS AFTERWARD RECEIVED OR OWNED IN TOTAL BY THE 
SURVIVOR OF THE JOINT TENANCY UPON THE MERE FIND-
ING OF THE COURT THAT THE DECEDENT LOVED HER 
CHILDREN EQUALLY, WANTED THEM TO HAVE THE PROPERTY 
WITHOUT IT HAVING TO BE PROBATED AND THAT SHE 
WANTED TO BE FAIR. 
-3-
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2. WHETHER THE COURT MAY LEGALLY SPECULATE AS TO 
THE INTENTION OF A DECEASED PERSON FROM THE 
FOLLOWING FACTS: 
A. A. CONVEYA-NCE INTO JOI NT TE NANCE WITH HERA.f.LF 
AND HER DAUGHTER IN 1962 OF A HOME AND REAL PROPERTY. 
B. THE CREATION OF A TENANCE IN COMMON BETWEEN HER 
CHILDREN BY HER CONVEYANCE OF HER INTEREST IN SAID 
REAL PROPERTY TO HER SON IN 1977. 
C. THE ABSENCE OF A LIKE TYPE OF CONVEYANCE OF HER 
INTEREST IN THE UTAH POWER AND LIGHT STOCK TO 
CREATE A TENANCY IN COMMON BETWEEN HER CHILDREN. 
3. WHETHER IT IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND JUDGMENT 
TO INFER THAT THE DECEDANT AFTER THE CONVEYANCE OF 
HER INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY ON THE 29th OF 
JULY 1977 TO HER SON STILL INTENDED THAT THE DAUGHTER 
RESPONDENT WOULD OWN THE HOUSE AND REAL PROPERTY AND 
THE SON APPELLANT WOULD OWN THE UTAH POWER AND LIGHT 
STOCK SEPARATELY, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE THAT ONE 
HALF { ~ ) OF EACH OF THE PROPERTIES WOULD BE DIVIDED 
BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES. 
POINT 1 
ABSENT SOME AFFIRMATIVE ACT ON THE PART OF EDITH 
BRANSCOMB OR THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT PRIOR TO EDITH 
BRANSCOMB'S DEATH IN 1977, THE UTAH POWER AND LIGHT 
STOCK, WHICH WAS HELD IN JOINT TENANCY BETWEEN SAID 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, AND THE DECEDENT PAST ABSOLUTELY 
TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, AND THE COURT'S JUDGMENT 
DIVESTING APPELLANT'S OWNERSHIP OF SAID PROPERTY 
WAS ILLEGAL AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
It seems almost superfulous to be arguing the point of 
law covering the Trial Court's Decision on the 13th day of 
November 1981. So basic, and so widely understood is the law 
governing Joint Tenancies and the rights of survivorship, and 
the law governing a persons absolute ownership of property, 
that this Honorable Court likely could rule from the bench. 
There is no issue of fact as to the conveyance of the 
Utah Power and Light Stock to the Plaintiff-Appellant and 
Mrs. Edith Branscomb in joint tenancy in 1962. 
There is no issue of fact as to the Stock ownership 
remaining in the form of a joint tenancy, unaltered by the 
affirmative act of either of the joint tenants until Mrs. 
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Branscomb's death in 1977 
While the word's "joint tenancy" as it relates to the 
Stocks was never used in the trial the following stipulations 
and testimony was provided for the trial court. 
MR. FROST: Your Honor, the parties have stipulated 
at this point that as far as the accounting is concerned 
that we are willing to accept the condition that exists 
at the present between the parties, regardless of who 
should prevail. That the accounting would not go back 
of this date; is that correct? 
MR. VLAHOS: That's correct. PART. TR. 2 
CROSS EXAM OF DOUGLAS CLOSE 
Q. In 1962 did she convey to your sister the house 
reserving as joint tenants with her and your sister, 
Arlene on that home? 
A. I think her nome is Allene 
Q. Allene, Mrs. Adams. 
A. Yes. 
Q. At the some time did she then turn over to you some 
shares of stock in Utah Power and Light? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And how many shares were there at that time, if 
you recall? 
A. 740 
Q. Now, how many shares are there today, sirJ 
A. 1,480 
Q. And at that time your mother gave your sister the 
house and gave you the stock; is that· correct? 
A. That's right. 
* * * * * 
Q. Now, you still retained the shares of stock and had 
in your possession or control over the years; is that 
correct? 
A. Thats' right. PART. TR. 4-6 
-5-
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DIRECT EXAMINATION ALLENE ADAMS Cont. 
Mr. 
Q. Now, it's true, is it not, that on or about May 1st, 
1962, your mother gave a piece of property to you, conveyed 
it to you in your name and her hame as joint tenants; is 
that correct? 
A. I guess that was the time she asked me what I wanted 
to do, and I told her just do what she wanted. 
Q. At the same time did she have stocks in Utah Power 
and Light? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you know what she did with those? 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Q. You are asking that the Court do one of two things, 
Mrs. Adams. You are asking that the Court either take 
the stock and the home and divide it equally between you 
and your brother, take all the stock and the home, add it 
up and divide it equally; or your brother keep the 
stock and you keep the home; is that correct? 
A. I guess you could say it that way. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I have always felt like the stock should have been 
his because this is what mother decided, but she also 
decided I should have the home, but I don't know. 
PART. TR. 6-8. 
The most that could be surmised from the above is that 
Close owned absolutely the stock. It cannot be surmised 
that the Respondent, Mrs. Adams, owned the home. It passed 
into a tenancy in common as this Honorable Court has decided. 
Whether the trial court had before it that the Stock 
passed absolutely to Mr. Close in 1962 or later under his 
rights of survivorship upon Mrs. Branscomb's death in 1977 
is immaterial. There was nothing to divest him of absolute 
ownership of the said stock, while there was the valid 
Deed in the case of the real property that caused Plaintiff 
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-Appellant to receive an undivided one half interest 
said home and real property. 
in the 
In the case of the stock, there has to be some legal 
basis upon which the court has the power to divest the 
Plaintiff-Appellant of said stock. 
Testimony disclosed little more than the fact that Mr. 
Close owned some stock which was given to him by the deceased 
Mrs. Branscomb. No mention was even ma<le or evidence established 
that would show the relative value of the two properties. 
Such evidence could have shed some light upon Mrs; Branscornb's 
intentions to be fair and equitable, if in deed, that is 
even material under the circumstances. Why Mrs. Branscomb 
did what she did in changing her original plan is gross 
speculation. 
Plaintiff-Appellant's counsel did not illicit testimony 
from the said Appellant concerning the uninterrupted joint 
tenancy on the Utah Power and Light Stock, and that it 
passed to the satd Appellant in 1977 upon Mrs. Branscomb's 
death. He possibly failed to do so since the~e appeared to 
be no way under any circumstances t~at a Court could divest 
property which was admittedly and undisputedly his. 
There was just no evidence provided the Court to enable 
it to do what it did, to wit: enforcing the deed giving 
Plaintiff-Appellant the undivided one half of the real 
property, and then divesting the Appellant of ~ of his 
Utah Power and Light Stock. 
-7-
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The record does disclose the nature of the original 
conveyance of the stock. It was conveyed in joint tenancy 
by the decedent,Mrs. Branscomb, to herself and Mr. Close, 
the Appellant. R. 35. The record, except as to the Aria~er~c~ 
to Respondent-Defendant's Interrogatory admitting to the 
stock conveyance March 20, 1982 creating the joint tenancy, 
.!.£ii·, is absolutely silent. There is nothing to indicate 
a change in the original plan created by the decedent. 
As a result, there remained all of the legal elements 
of a joint tenancy between Mrs. Branscomb and the Appellant 
necessary to cause absolute ownership in the Appellant upon 
the death of Mrs. Branscomb. 
A joint interest is one owned by two 
or more persons in equal shares by a 
title created by a single will or 
transfer when expressly declared in :r 
the will or transfer to be a joint 
tenancy. 
four unites are essential to an 
estate in joint tenancy; unity of int-
erest, unity of time, unity of title 
and unity of possession. 
Tenhet vs. Boswell, 
554-P2d 331~------
With the death of Mrs. Branscomb, Appellant, being 
the survivor on the joint tenancy of the Utah Power and 
Light Stock, he became the absolute owner. 
Survivorship is the distinctive character-
istic or major incident of an estate in 
joint tenancy. Indeed, the right of surv-
ivorship is inher~nt in a joint tenancy 
estate under the common law, and the 
indident of survivorship grows out of the 
application of common-law principles 
wholly independent of statute. Such 
right i~ viewed as existing by implication 
in a joint tenancy. 48 A C.J.S. JOINT 
TENANCY § 3 
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The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the law 
relating to Joint Tenancy, and absent a showing of fraud, 
mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, or absent 
a showing by clear and convincing evidenc~ that the parties 
intended otherwise the rule of survivorship is 1 applicable 
and the presumption of validity of the joint tenancy and 
right of survivorship exists where both parties are living 
or where a party has deceased. Pa~~£ v. WalkeE, 539 P.2d 452 
(1975); ~cCul!£ug~ v. Wa~~rb~~ 418 P. 2d 691(1974); 
~£~~~ v. ~~~!£.!!, 25 Utah 2d 206, 479 P. 2d 472 (1971) 
Woodward v. 23 Utah 2d 318, 462 P. 2d 715 (1969); 
442 P. 2d 472 (1968); ~ayw_££~ v. Qi.!_!., 16 Utah 2d 299, 
400 P.2d 16 (1965): !~~~re~ v. In~~!!~, 12 Utah 2d 388 
( 1 9 6 2 ) : ~E~~~~ v . .!:~~~ n d , 1 2 U t ah 2 d 3 8 4 , 3 6 7 P . 2 d 
177 (1962) 
The Court, and the Honorable Douglas Cornaby, when it 
set forth its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
wherein it stated: 
2. That the Court finds that Mrs. Branscombe 
was certainly competent in 1962 when she began 
to make a disp osition of her property to both 
the Plaintiff and to the defendant, her son 
and daughter respectively. 
3. The Court believes and finds from the test-
imony that was given that the nature of what 
the decedent was doing was transfering the 
property so that she could avoid probate by 
distributing this property to those who 
meant the most to her and to whom she thought 
ought to have the property. R. 195 
The Court in making those findings of fact has fore-
closed himself from the action he took, because to find 
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that Mrs. Branscombe was competent to do what she did and to 
find that her motive was to prevent probate, he is also 
finding that Mrs. Branscombe intended to give the rights 
of survivorship and absolute ownership to her son of the 
Utah Power and Light Sto~k. To then conclude in the Con-
clusions Law that: 
3. The court concludes that one-half of 
the stocks that the plaintiff now has in his 
possessibn shall be the pr6perty of the 
Defendant, and that said stock may be ordered 
sold or the Plaintiff may transfer one-half 
of the shares, plus any accured dividends to 
the Defendant from the time of this hearing. 
is absured. R.196-197 
This Court held in Hobbs v. Fenton, 25 Utah 2d 206, 
479 P. 2d 472 (1971) that 
Where the father understood that by placing 
title to his stocks and bank account in joint 
tenancy with his daughter with full rights 
of survivorship, the same would automatically 
vest full title in the daughter on the father's 
death. at p. 
This case seemed to place emphasis on the fact that 
the father was shown to have desired and intended such 
a result, and there was no claim or evidence to indicate any 
fraud, mistake or undue influence on the part of the 
daughter. The Court held that the proper passed to the 
daughter on the father's death. Ibid, p. 
There is no question but that Mrs. Branscombe intended 
to see the stocks pass to the Appellant upon her death, 
and the trial Court so held. To make such a finding and then 
divest him of the stock is to deny to the Appellant rights 
-10-
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to his property. John Locke, the English philosopher which 
is said to be the source from which Thomas Jefferson got 
much of the language that went into the Declaration of In-
---------------~-
John Locke said in his Second Treatise on Govern~ 
------~------------------
ment that men have "inalienable rights" to life,liberty and 
property. While Jefferson substituted the word "propertyri 
for "the pursuit of happiness" the word "property" was brought 
back into the same language that was put in Article 14 Section 
1 of the Constitution of the United States i.e. "No State 
------------~-------------------
shall deny to any person life, liberty or property without 
due process of law." While the Courts concentrate upon the 
process, and require that all of the procedures must be followed 
to deny a person his property, the real sacred element in 
that provision is the word "law". A person's property should 
be considered like his life "inalienable" unless there is a 
' ' 
compelling reason to so alienate it from him. 
There is no compelling reason given by the Court in any 
of its Findings of Fact to divest the stock as it did, and 
certainly not a finding that ". the decedent loved both 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant equally. (or) the 
Court finds that nothing has been presented in Court to 
pursuade the Court that she loved the Defendant less II 1. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Cnurt .canno-t --sttbS:titute i=ts~own "belief" in what it thought 
the Decedent, Mrs. Edith Branscombe, intended for what is 
presumed under the law that she intended by the act of 
( 1) creating two different joint tenancies with herself on 
~~~~~~on~ nYnnorties, (2) thereafter transferring her 
-11-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
own interest in the one property) to wit; the home and real 
property under joint tenancy b.etween her and her daughter, 
and (3) allowing the Stock to remain as it was, in joint 
tenancy between her and her son. 
Under the law, from the foregoing facts, for what ever 
reason known only to her, it must be presumed that she 
intended that the Appellant have all of the stock and one 
half {~) interest in the house and real property. The Tri al 
Court has to first say that Mrs. Branscombe made a mistake. 
Loving the children equally as she did, she would have given 
to her daughter her own joint tenancy interest in the Stock 
if she had only thought of it. Therefore the Court will say 
she made a mistake, and will correct her mistake. 
Equally as good speculation is the speculation that 
the home and real property was later transferred to the son 
as a protective measure to become his because of his favorable 
attitude that she should not be put in a nursing home, but be 
allowed to remain in the home. 
From the testimony of Dr. Benders who treated and cared 
for her medical needs we read the following: 
Q. What date was she dicharged from the hospital 
at that time? 
A. She was discharged on February 3rd, '77. 
Q. Did she express to you at that time any 
concern about going home? 
A. Yes, she did. She was rather insistent 
on being discharged back to her bwn home. 
Q. Had you discussed with her going to a 
nursing home? 
A. We had. 
Q. And what did you decide about that issue? 
A. Well, because of the rather marked amount 
of physical assistance that she requited I 
think our recommendation was that she go to a 
nursing home. However, she was determin d to 
go home, and she in fact made that decis on and 
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the family concurred with it. R. Tr. 96-97. 
While it is gross speculation comparable to that used 
by the Court in its findings, one could conclude that the 
house was transferred by the decedent to the one she be-
lieved would make certain that she could live out her last 
days there. In this case that would be the son, the 
Appellant herein. 
If we wanted, we could go into the testimony of Janice 
Arnold who also stated that Mrs. Branscomb didn't want to 
go into a rest home, and infer that the later disposition 
of her property was designed to prevent that from happening. 
This too would undoubtedly be called speculation. R. Tr. 124. 
H~nce we ,un.-d·erstand tlie ·;reasons given by this honorable 
€ourt in its rulings that absent some evidence clearly 
and convincingly tending to show that she did not intend to 
create the joint tenancy, it must be presumed she intended 
the result that she created. 
That portion of the Court's Judgement that requires that 
the Appellant surrender one half (~) of the Utah Power and 
Light Stock should be reversed, and the Appellant be allowed 
to keep said stocks. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 
day of March 1982. 
By 
-------------~--------------
Attorney for Appellant. 
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__ true and accurate copies of the aforegoing Appellant's 
Brief to the attorney for the Respondent, Pete N~ Vlahos, 
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Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401. 
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